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Universal service obligations impose specific costs on the universal service provider. The measure of these 
costs and their financing have been studied along two complementary lines of reasoning: is the universal 
service obligation sustainable? Who should bear its costs? Most often, a two-step procedure is put forward. In 
a first step the cost of USO must be assessed; in a second step the USP must be compensated for this cost. In 
this  paper  we  argue  that  this  procedure  is  most  often  problematic  because  the  implementation  of  the 
compensation scheme directly affects the effective cost of USO. We therefore put forward an alternative 
approach  to  this  problem  which  does  not  rely  on  this  two-step  procedure  and  fully  acknowledges  the 
distortions that result from the compensation mechanism. 
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Universal service obligations (hereafter USO) have long been imposed in
industries like telecommunication, energy or postal services. USO can be
broadly divided into two categories: Obligations in terms of quality (min-
imum quality standards, ubiquity of the service) and in terms of prices
(uniform price, aﬀordable price). USO do not retain much attention when
the industry is organized as a (possibly regulated) monopoly. As a matter of
fact, when the universal service provider (hereafter USP) is a monopolist, the
USO are self-ﬁnanced by internal cross-subsidies: The proﬁts realized on the
proﬁtable market segments ﬁnance the losses made on the loss-making seg-
ments that the USP must serve as part of the USO. However, the coexistence
of competition, as resulting from the current trend in market liberalization,
and USO might be problematic. Competition erodes the USP’s proﬁt and,
eventually, threatens the ﬁnancial viability of the USP who might not be
able to sustain the same standard of services in a liberalized market as under
monopoly.
In order to maintain universal services in a competitive environment,
the design of an appropriate USO funding mechanism may be necessary.
A standard approach to the ﬁnancing issue is the following: First, using an
appropriate methodology, the net cost of the universal service for its provider
is evaluated. Second, based on this cost estimate, the need for a funding
mechanism is assessed and, if necessary, an appropriate funding is chosen
and implemented. Typically, this approach is followed by the European
Commission for the postal sector.
”Where a Member State determines that the universal service
obligations entail a net cost, calculated taking into account An-
nex I, and represent an unfair ﬁnancial burden on the universal
service provider(s), it may introduce: (a) a mechanism to com-
pensate the undertaking(s) concerned from public funds; or (b) a
mechanism for the sharing of the net cost of the universal service
obligations between providers of services and/or users.” (Third
postal directive (2008/6/EC), Article 7, §3)
In this paper, we shall argue that, whenever option (b) is retained, this
two-step approach is misleading because it fails to recognize the distortions
induced by any sharing mechanism of this kind. That is, compensating the
USP on the basis of an estimated net cost of the USO is likely to be inappro-
priate whenever the tax modiﬁes the behavior of the market participants.
1An extreme example is provided by the Finnish postal market. The
Finnish postal market has been fully liberalized since 1994. The regulator
has imposed a licensing system and, accordingly, an alternative postal oper-
ator that would operate only in densely populated areas would have to pay
a fee. This fee aims at ensuring that high quality services are provided also
in sparsely populated areas. Actually, this fee is so high that it constitutes
an entry barrier. As a result, the incumbent Finnish postal operator still
enjoys a near monopoly position. Clearly enough, if this entry fee is based
on an USO costing exercise, the estimated cost does not correspond to the
actual cost because the costing exercise failed to take into account that the
resulting tax is ﬁxed at a deterrent level.
In this paper, we argue that, whenever a USO funding mechanism mod-
iﬁes market behavior, the induced change in the USP’s proﬁt must be in-
cluded as part of the compensation for the universal service. If a universal
service tax partially shelters the incumbent from competition, the additional
proﬁts made by the USP should be accounted for as part of the USO funding
mechanism. Accordingly, the tax proceeds collected should be inferior to the
estimated cost of the USO. Otherwise, the incumbent would be overcom-
pensated. The funding should not be based on a ex-ante costing exercise.
Instead, we put forward the competitive neutrality criterion where the prof-
its of the USP, in a funded USO scenario, are equal to some benchmark
level.
The paper is organized as follows. First we discuss the scope for evalu-
ating the cost of USO ex-ante, i.e. independently of its possible ﬁnancing.
Several possible measures are discussed. Second we argue that, apart for the
cases where non-distortionary taxation is suﬃcient to ensure compensation,
the ex-ante cost of USO should not serve as a basis for determining the level
of compensation. Relying on a competitive neutrality criterion allows to
determine the tax level that will ensure adequate compensation. Third, we
develop an example that fully illustrates our general argument.
2 Compensating for the cost of USO
2.1 Measuring the net cost of the USO
Consider a given set of universal service constraints (universal coverage,
uniform price, ...) exogenously decided by a regulator. Assume further that
a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm would not have spontaneously oﬀered the whole set
of products or services prescribed by the USO. Then, complying with these
obligations is costly for the USP. The (net) cost of the USO may thus be
2broadly deﬁned as the cost of conforming to these obligations. To measure
this cost, several methodologies have been proposed. The net avoided cost
(NAC), the entry pricing (Rodriguez and Storer, 2000) and the proﬁtability
cost (Panzar, 2000 and Cremer et al., 2000) are the most popular.1 And,
obviously, the cost of the USO depends on the way it is measured.
• The NAC is an accounting exercise that consists in identifying the
unproﬁtable submarkets for which the incremental cost exceeds the
incremental revenue.2 The NAC cost of the USO is then the additional
proﬁt that the USP would be able to achieve if it were relieved of the
USO and allowed to withdraw from the unproﬁtable submarkets. The
NAC has been criticized on the grounds that it is essentially a static
approach that fails to take into account any change in the market
structure i.e. the net avoided cost of the USO is based on a comparison
between the incumbent’s proﬁt in a monopolized market with and
without USO.
The other methods consider that issue explicitly as they are both based
on the comparisons of two diﬀerent market scenarios.
• The entry pricing approach compares the regulated monopoly situa-
tion that prevails before market liberalization (scenario ’m’) and the
liberalized market scenario with competition and USO (scenario ’cu’).
The entry cost of the USO is equal to the lost revenue for the incum-
bent (referred to as ﬁrm I) on the set N of contested markets where
entry occurs minus the impact of entry on the incumbent’s total cost.











jI are the incumbent’s receipts in a contested sub-
market j ∈ N before and after entry and CI(Qm
I ) and CI(Qcu
I ) are the
incumbent’s total cost in the scenarios ’m’ and ’cu’ respectively.3
1In all these approaches, it is assumed that the USP is an eﬃcient operator i.e. costs
are best practice costs. Thus, in principle, the net cost of the USO does not include any
cost due to productive ineﬃciency.
2Distinguishing proﬁtable and unproﬁtable products is far from obvious when there
are common costs that must be allocated (see Pearsall, 2009 for a recent contribution).
3If the incumbent does not change its price after entry, then the entry pricing cost of






3• The proﬁtability cost approach is based on a comparison of the in-
cumbent’s proﬁt in the scenario ’cu’ and a counterfactual scenario
(scenario ’c’) with competition but without USO (the so-called un-
subsidized market scenario, Panzar, 2000).4 The resulting proﬁt for
the incumbent USP, Πc
I, is then compared with its actual proﬁt in a
liberalized market with USO, Πcu
I . The proﬁtability cost of the USO




It estimates the loss in proﬁts incurred by the USP speciﬁcally due
to the USO, independently of the liberalization process since in both
scenarios the USP faces competition.5
2.2 Funding USO
If providing the universal service proves to be costly, the regulator may com-
pensate the USP. In this context, it seems logical to rely on some estimated
cost of the USO ( be it ∆USOep or ∆USOπ) as a basis for determining the
compensation for fulﬁlling the USO. However, as developed hereafter, this
intuition needs to be qualiﬁed.
In order to ﬁnance the USO, regulators face two basic options: public
funds and cost-sharing mechanisms. In this paper, we focus only on the
latter option. The principle is the following: the regulator creates a universal
service fund; the fund is ﬁnanced by taxes levied on market participants and
receipts are used to compensate the USP. The choice of an appropriate tax
base is a very complex question in practice.6 In this paper, we consider
two classes of taxes: a non-distortionary tax (a lump-sum entry fee) and a
distortionary tax. The lump-sum tax is non-distortionary unless it deters
entry (because of a deterring level as in the Finnish case). A distortionary
tax modiﬁes market prices, quantities exchanged and the set of contested
markets where entrants have decided to compete in. At the very least, it
may also aﬀect the decision to compete which might be delayed or even
4A similar approach is recommended by the European Commission in the third postal
directive (2008/6/EC, Annex I).
5The proﬁtability cost approach does not make any reference to the regulated monopoly
situation (scenario ’m’). Cremer et al. (2000) decompose the transition from a monopo-
lized market to a liberalized market into a proﬁtability cost of liberalization measured as










6See the discussion and the examples in Oxera (2007), Borsenberger et al. (2009) and
Gautier and Paolini (2010).
4abandoned. Distortionary taxes include taxes on output, revenues, turnover
that are all used in practice for ﬁnancing universal service funds.
In order to assess the eﬀects of a funded USO, we have to develop a
fourth scenario ’cuf’ with competition, USO and a funding mechanism. In
this scenario, entrants will be asked to contribute to ﬁnancing the USO by
paying a tax.7 We denote by T the entry fee, by τ the distortionary tax and
by T(τ) the associated tax proceeds.
Suppose that there are only two ﬁrms competing on the market, the
incumbent (ﬁrm I) and a potential entrant (ﬁrm E). The ﬁrms’ gross proﬁts
(before tax) in the scenario ’cuf’ are denoted by Π
cuf
k , k = I,E.W h e nt h e
tax is distortionary then Π
cuf
k (τ) ￿=Π cu
k . The tax proceeds collected by the
universal service fund will be paid back to the USP. Net payoﬀs are thus
Π
cuf




How should the regulator choose the tax level? In particular, should the
tax proceeds be equal to the estimated cost of the USO? The answer to
this latter question is ’yes’ in the case of an entry fee because it is non-
distortionary. The entry fee T equals to ∆USO exactly compensates the
USP for the USO, provided that ﬁrms eﬀectively compete on the market.
An entry fee can solve the USO ﬁnancing problem and is compatible with
market competition if
T =∆ USO (3)
Πcu
E ≥ T (4)
The only limit to the use of an entry fee is the feasibility constraint (4). If
one adopts the proﬁtability cost approach to estimate the net cost of the





That is if aggregate proﬁts in the scenario ’cu’ with competition and USO
are greater than the incumbent’s proﬁt when it faces competition but it is
relieved from the USO. When this condition is not satisﬁed, the entry fee
T =∆ USO that fully compensates the incumbent for the ex-ante cost of
7The funding mechanism we consider is thus a Pay-or-Play. The incumbent will fulﬁll
the USO (the ’play’ option), the entrants will contribute to the ﬁnancing (the ’pay’ option).
5USO deters entry. Thus the regulator must use a distortionary tax to ﬁnance
the USO (or it accepts that no competition eﬀectively takes place).8
2.2.2 Distortionary tax
Distortionary taxation reduces the competitive pressures exerted on the in-
cumbent and this ’weaker competition eﬀect’ is part of the USO funding
package. By protecting incumbent, the tax decreases the actual cost of the
USO for the USP, so that the amount to be transferred through taxes in
order to ensure a fair USO ﬁnancing decreases. Therefore, compensating
the incumbent at a level ∆USO with the help of a distortionary
tax would actually lead to overcompensation.
With a distortionary tax τ>0, the incumbent’s proﬁt in the scenario
’cuf’ is not equal to its proﬁt in the scenario ’cu’. The incumbent’s net
payoﬀ when it receives a compensation equal to ∆USO is equal to
Π
cuf
I (τ)+∆ USO (6)
As compared to the entry fee, the USP is thus strictly better oﬀ with a
distortionary tax τ such that T(τ)=∆ USO if Π
cuf
I > Πcu
I i.e., if the
distortionary tax increases the incumbent’s proﬁt. With a tax τ levied on
the entrant, this condition is likely to be satisﬁed. Think for example of an
output tax; its eﬀect is akin to an increase in the entrant’s marginal cost who
then supplies a lower quantity at a higher price. Eventually, it also reduces
the set of contested markets. This is clearly detrimental to ﬁrm E but not to
ﬁrm I who faces a less aggressive competitor. With distortionary taxation,
the regulator relies thus on two sources of income to ﬁnance the net cost
of the USO: the tax proceeds T(τ) and the incumbent’s additional proﬁt
created by the distortionary taxation Π
cuf
I −Πcu
I . Taking this into account,
the tax must be set at a level that guarantees that the global compensation
is equal to the net cost of the USO. In addition, the tax must be compatible
with competition on the market. That is, the tax τ must satisfy:
8When the two types of taxes are possible, it is not necessarily obvious that the lump-
sum tax is the preferred option. The universal service obligations may place the universal
service provider at a competitive disadvantage, for example when some form of uniform
pricing is required. A distortive universal service tax may then be used to countervail the
impact of the universal service obligations (see for instance the examples in Armstrong,
2001 and Mirabel et al., 2009). For that reason, even if a lump-sum tax is feasible,
the regulator may eventually prefer a distortive tax to place all the competitors on a level
playing ﬁeld. The choice then depends on the distortive impact of both the set of universal
service constraints and the associated ﬁnancing.
6Π
cuf
I (τ) − Πcu
I + T(τ)=∆ USO (7)
Π
cuf
E (τ) ≥ T(τ) (8)
These two constraints into account imply that the compensation from
the universal service fund cannot be equal to the estimated cost of the USO,
whatever the deﬁnition we retain to measure that cost, when the taxes used
to ﬁnance the fund are distortionary.9 And, in particular, the tax proceeds
should be inferior to the estimated net cost of the USO when imposing a
tax increases the incumbent’s proﬁt.







More generally, whenever ﬁnancing USO with an entry fee is not feasible,
it is possible to use a distortionary tax if this tax increases the industry








Finally, we would like to point the analogy between the above approach to
USO ﬁnancing and the concept of competitive neutrality. The criterion of
competitive neutrality has often been put forward for qualifying the universal
service and its supporting mechanism, especially in the telecommunications.
In the US, the FCC requires that the universal service support mechanisms
and rule should be competitively neutral. In this context, competitive neu-
trality means that universal service support mechanisms and rules neither
unfairly advantage nor disadvantage one provider over another. Roughly
speaking, the universal service and its ﬁnancing are competitively neutral if
they do not create a competitive advantage or disadvantage for the provider
or the competitors. A possible way to interpret this requirement (adopted
for instance by Chon´ e et al., 2002) is to impose that the proﬁt of the des-
ignated provider is at least as big as the proﬁt it would collect if it were
relieved from the universal service obligations (in the scenario ’c’).




I + T(τ) ≥ Πc
I (10)
9However, the deﬁnition retained for the cost of USO will obviously determine a par-
ticular compensation level and therefore the feasibility of a ﬁnancing scheme.
7Like the proﬁtability cost approach, competitively neutrality relies on an
unsubsidized market scenario ’c’ to determine the incumbent’s benchmark
proﬁt level. When ∆USO =∆ USOπ, the USO funding exercise we just
described satisﬁes competitive neutrality: Conditions (4) and (8) are equiv-
alent to (10) when ∆USO=∆ USOπ.
In the next section, we illustrate by mean of an example the extent to
which the implementation of a distortionary tax might supplant the use of
an entry fee in order to ﬁnance USO when this last instrument would deter
entry. While doing this, we also show that when distortionary taxation is
used, funding the USP at the level of the ex-ante cost of USO would induce
overcompensation.
3 An example
We consider a continuum of independent local markets indexed by x in the
[0,1] interval. On each market, active ﬁrms compete in quantities. Produc-
tion costs are normalized to zero and the demand is given by P =1− Q
where Q is the aggregate supply. In order to serve a local market, ﬁrms
must incur a ﬁxed cost F(x), with F￿ > 0. For illustrative purpose, we use a
linear function F(x)=f.x where f is a positive constant. There are at most
two active ﬁrms in a local market, the incumbent (ﬁrm I) and the entrant
(ﬁrm E). The gross proﬁt realized by ﬁrm k = I,E on market x is equal to
Pqk from which the ﬁxed cost must be subtracted.
Universal service obligations are imposed on ﬁrm I but not on ﬁrm E.
USO consist of a universal coverage constraint: ﬁrm I must serve all markets
in [0,1]. USO do not include any form of price regulation and absent a
uniform price constraint, prices may diﬀer across markets.10 Firm E serves
only those markets which are proﬁtable to her, i.e. she targets those markets
with the lowest ﬁxed cost. We denote by nE, the last market served by E,
so that the industry can be decomposed into a subset [0,n E] of contested
markets where ﬁrms I and E compete in quantities and a subset [nE,1]
where ﬁrm I remains as a monopolist.
• Scenario ’m’ : Consider ﬁrst the pre-liberalization stage where ﬁrm I
monopolizes all the markets. On each market, I supplies the monopoly
quantity qm =1 /2, sold at price Pm =1 /2 and realizes a gross proﬁt of 1/4.
10Notice that when USO entails restrictions in the price structure of the USP, the
ﬁnancing issue we discuss in this note is even more stringent since these restrictions will
further decrease ﬁrm I’s proﬁts.















USO are therefore sustainable in a monopoly whenever Πm
I ≥ 0 ⇒ f ≤ 1
2.
Firm I realizes a positive net proﬁt on all markets x ∈ [0, 1
4f], these proﬁts
subsidize the loss realized on the remaining [ 1
4f,1] markets. These losses





4 − fx)dx =
81(1−4f)2
2592f . All markets are
proﬁtable whenever f ≤ 1
4.
In the sequel, we assume that f ∈ [1
4, 1
2]. In this case, USO imposed on
a monopolist are always sustainable but never voluntary.
• Scenario ’c’: Consider next the liberalized market case in the absence
of USO. In each contested market, ﬁrm k supplies a quantity qk = 1
3,t h e
market clears at price P = 1
3 and the gross proﬁt is equal to 1
9. Net proﬁts
are positive for the subset of markets [0, 1
9f]. On markets in [ 1
9f, 1
4f], net
proﬁts are positive whenever only one ﬁrm operates and supplies qm.W e
will assume that those markets will be served by ﬁrm I. Markets in [ 1
4f,1]

































• Scenario ’cu’: Consider ﬁnally the case where ﬁrm I is subject to the
ubiquity constraint and faces a competitor. Notice that the only diﬀerence
between this scenario and the previous one is the obligation faced by ﬁrm I
to serve those unproﬁtable markets located in [ 1
4f,1]. The best she can do is
to supply the monopoly quantity qm in these markets. The resulting payoﬀs
can be expressed as the monopoly proﬁts under USO minus the proﬁts lost













while the entrant’s proﬁt remains unchanged at the level Πc
E. As noted
above, whenever f>1
4, the proﬁtability cost of the USO is positive.11














We now use our simple model to illustrate the choice of funding mecha-
nism for the USO. We therefore consider a fourth scenario ’cuf’ with com-
petition, USO and a compensation mechanism, which relies on a funding
mechanism T(τ). We consider two options. One is to use an output tax:
T(τ)=τnEqE, the other is a lump-sum entry fee T(τ)=T.
The regulator aims at ensuring USO, while ensuring competitive neu-




I + T(τ) ≥ 0, Π
cuf
E − T(τ) ≥ 0.
2. Competitive neutrality: Π
cuf
I + T(τ) ≥ Πc
I.
The ﬁrst instrument to consider is a lump-sum fee. By deﬁnition, a lump
sum fee does not modify the way ﬁrms compete on the markets i.e. proﬁts
in the scenario ’cu’ are equal to those in ’cuf’, unless it is set a level that




If the regulator adopts the competitive neutral criterion, the entry fee
must be equal to:
T =∆ USOπ. (17)
Combining (16) and (17), we have:
Proposition 1 When compensation is ensured through a lump-sum trans-
fer, it is possible to ensure a competitively neutral and sustainable USO
whenever f ≤ 13
36.
The second instrument to consider is the output tax. In this case, sce-
narios ’cu’ and ’cuf’ are no longer equivalent. With a tax τ on each quantity
supplied by the entrant, ﬁrms I and E are asymmetric. Optimal quanti-
ties in the Cournot game are: qE = 1−2τ
3 and qI = 1+τ
3 . The contested
markets clear at a price P = 1+τ
3 . Notice that the market coverage by the
10entrant now depends on the tax. More precisely, ﬁrm E covers all markets
in [0,
(1−2τ)2































Notice that the non-negativity constraint on qE determines a feasibility
condition τ ≤ 1
2; higher tax rates completely deter entry.




I, we obtain a critical value for τ as






4(−82 + 1296(1 − 2f)f)
1
4)
If we evaluate that level of tax proceeds, as given by equation (20), for
τ =ˆ τ, we may observe that the corresponding amount is always strictly
smaller than
81(1−4f)2
2592f , which is the ex-ante cost of USO. In other words,
a distortionary tax that would compensate the USO provider with a tax
proceeds equal to
81(1−4f)2
2592f would amount to overcompensate ﬁrm I since
the resulting proﬁt would strictly exceed Πc
I.
It then remains to identify the domain for which ˆ τ(f) satisﬁes the fea-





10). Summing up we have therefore established the following
proposition




10)], there exists a sustainable
output tax ˆ τ(f) that ensures competitive neutrality.
A direct implication of the above proposition is the following:





cannot be achieved, neither with a lump-sum, nor an output tax.
Notice that the critical value 1
36(9 + 2
√
10) is also a solution to the
equation Πm
I =Π c
I: competitive neutrality cannot be implemented by an
11output tax whenever the level of f is such that placing the USO constraint
on a monopolist incumbent cannot be competitively neutral either.
Notice also that the amount to be ﬁnanced to ensure competitive neu-
trality under an output tax is strictly decreasing in f. This immediately
follows from the fact that a larger output tax better shields the incumbent
from competition by the entrant, therefore, part of the virtual proﬁtability
cost of USO is actually indirect ﬁnanced by a less tough competition that
preserves the incumbent’s margins. Should the regulator insist on covering
∆USOπ while relying on an output tax, this would clearly lead to an over-
compensation of the USP. Finally, one should note that the distortionary
tax negatively impacts consumers welfare, though two channels: higher price
and fewer contested markets. As a consequence, a regulator which is con-
cerned by consumer welfare while sticking to competitive neutrality should
prefer a lump-sum whenever it is possible to implement it.



















Figure 1: Optimal tax for a competitively neutral USO ﬁnancing
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown that an estimated cost of the USO should be used carefully
in any USO policy. In particular, it cannot be used to determine the size of
the universal service fund because, such a policy would ignore the impact
of taxation on the ﬁrms’ market behavior. In a funded USO scenario, the
compensation for the USP comes from both the universal service fund and
from lower competitive pressures. If regulators fail to take this into account,
the USP is likely to be overcompensated. Thus, dissociating the USO costing
exercise and the USO funding exercise is inappropriate because it leads
either to an unnecessary compensation or to the absence of competition. If
the compensation for the USO burden is based on an estimated cost of the
USO, the compensation is likely to be inappropriate because the USO burden
is endogenous to the funding mechanism (Boldron et al., 2009). Instead of
12relying on an estimated cost of the USO, we consider exclusively a funded
USO scenario and compare it to an appropriate benchmark level. In the
paper, we use the unsubsidized market scenario to determine the benchmark
proﬁt level because the competitively neutral criterion is closely linked to
the proﬁtability cost of the USO. In the literature and in practice, other
criterions have also been used.
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